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It is  clear who has suffered most and benefited least from the forced anschluss of East Timor with Indonesia. By c u rre n t estimates almost certainly  more than  
100,000 Timorese—one-six th  of the total population—have died as the  d irect and ind irect resu lt of the  December 1975 invasion and subsequent occupation. There are no favorable accounts by neu tra l observers of the general behavior of Indone­sian troops toward the  local population du rin g  or a fte r the  actual invasion. The main object of Indonesian government activity  even in  1979 appears to be the  p u r­suit of a few hundred tenacious guerrillas ra th e r  than  the reconstruction  of a sh attered  economy and society.
Indonesia has also paid a price for its  v icto ry . Tens of thousands of troops— 
sometimes, in  the initial invasion, accidentally deployed against each o ther—were unable to quell Timorese resistance , exhibiting to them selves and o thers the  poor p repara tion , disorganization, and lack of battle  readiness of the Indonesian armed forces. They now face the p rosp ec t, as in Irian  Jaya, of p ro trac ted  sporadic guer­rilla w arfare. Malaysians and Singaporeans w ere, at least b rie fly , d isturbed by what sounded like an echo of Sukarno’s aggressively  nationalistic foreign policy. The Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, f irs t in  Sri Lanka and most recently  in Havana, has by large majorities condemned Indonesian aggression. A ustralia’s government has been accommodating enough, bu t many of its  citizens have been 
sympathetic to the plight of the Timorese, giving what help they could to  the  re ­sistance movement, and becoming the main conduit to the outside world of accurate information about events in Timor. They continue today to prick  the  world's con­
science, keeping the issue alive despite  an Indonesian-imposed wall of silence 
around the te rr ito ry .
What did Indonesia's government get in re tu rn  for Timorese su ffering  and its  own diminished domestic and in ternational standing? Not the  fulfillment of a sov­
ereign claim, since East Timor, while a Portuguese possession, had never been a p a rt of Indonesian te rrito ria l ambitions. Not wealth, as Timor was both impover­ished and neglected by its  d istan t ru le rs . R ather, Indonesia rid  itse lf of a left- nationalist independent Timor th a t would probably have pu rsued  a domestic devel­opment s tra teg y  and an accompanying foreign policy at odds with Jak a rta 's  eco­nomic and political dependence on the  industrialized  capitalist w orld. Was th is 
achievement worth the  costs even for Indonesia?
Jill Jolliffe, an A ustralian journalist who was in East Timor from September to December 1975, th inks th a t Indonesia should not have in tervened  at all. Like those who fought for Indonesian independence in  1945, she is  an uncompromising nationalist. "[N ]o m atter which argum ents are  employed to support the  indepen-
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denee case—cu ltu ra l, economic, historical—th e re  is one overrid ing  argum ent, the rig h t of the  East Timorese to determine th e ir  own destiny . If as the  evidence su g­g ests , th ere  ex ists a w idespread will to independence, th a t is a sufficient a rg u ­ment , irrespective  of questions of 'v iab ility ', of the  p reparedness of the popula­tion , of the  sensitiv ity  of the region in the eyes of neighbouring countries" (p . 304).
Much of Jolliffe 's book, which is the most complete account to date of the  Indo­nesian invasion, set in a broad context of Timorese h isto ry  and contem porary re ­gional (mainly Indonesian and A ustralian) politics, is designed to support th is 
argum ent. A long firs t chap ter describes the  ethnic and linguistic d iversity  of th e  island and traces its  colonial h is to ry , from the  arrival of the firs t Portuguese Dominican fria rs  in  the  six teen th  cen tu ry  to the collapse of the  Caetano govern­ment in 1974. Jolliffe emphasizes precolonial political and cu ltural d ifferences be­tween East and West Timor, the  separate  development of the two halves of the  island—one under Portuguese, and th e  o ther und er firs t D utch, then  Indonesian 
ru le—th e  absence of serious Indonesian in te re s t in  East Timor until the  1970s, and the  emergence in  Dili in the  1960s and 1970s of a small politically conscious, P ortu­guese-speak ing , educated elite, with reform ist and eventually nationalist 
ideas. The second chap ter details the  b rie f organizational h istories and ideologies of the colony's th ree  principal political p a rtie s : Apodeti (Associaeao Popular Demo- cratica  T im orense), UDT (Uniao Democratica T im orense), and Fretilin  (F ren te  Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independen te ). Apodeti was the smallest of the 
th re e , p ro-Indonesian , and concentrated in  the  w estern p a rt of the colony near 
the Indonesian bo rder. UDT was closely tied to the Portuguese establishm ent and gradualist in its  political and social aims. Initially the la rgest group , it apparen tly  lost substan tia l support to the more radical and militant F retilin . The core of the book is an account of the political even ts of 1975, from the UDT-Fretilin coalition formed in  January  to the A ugust UDT coup, the  b rief civil war which ended with Fretilin  v ictory  in Septem ber, the declaration of independence in  November, and the  Indonesian invasion on December 7. Jolliffe 's main concerns here are  to dem­onstra te  F re tilin 's  growing popular support and its  full control of East Timor be­tween September and December, and to draw a con trast between Indonesia's public position of watchful concern and its  covert in terventions calculated to achieve the destruction  of Fretilin  and the  incorporation of the  te rr ito ry .
In the  telling of th is s to ry  it is clear th a t Jolliffe 's sympathies are  given not only to  th e  abstrac t cause of Timorese nationalism bu t to Fretilin  as its  concrete 
embodiment. Of necessity  she makes m ajoritarian claims (difficult to prove since elections were never he ld , b u t eyewitness accounts tend to support h e r ) , bu t her g reater in te re s t is  in the qualities of F retilin  leaders and th e ir  program s for eco­
nomic and social development. F retilin  modeled itse lf a fte r the independence move­ments in  P ortugal's African colonies, specifically Mozambique's Frelimo. It was certain ly  not communist (as Indonesian propaganda charged , and as many Indone­
sian leaders may even have believed) bu t left-na tionalist, populist, and egalitar­ian . I ts  program s "called for economic reconstruction  th rough  the  creation of co­
operatives of production , d istrib u tio n , and consumption as the basic unit of eco­nomic life , the  elimination of 'excessive' dependency on foreign im ports, the  
discouraging of monoculture and the implementation of agrarian  reform defined as th e  expropriation of all large farms and the  utilisation of unused fertile  land to be 
worked within the cooperative system" (p . 75). In late 1974 and early  1975, it actually in itiated some pilot consumer and agricu ltu ra l cooperative projects and a village literacy program influenced by the work of the  Brazilian educational theo­
r is t Paulo F re ire .
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Jolliffe's evident sympathy for th e  Fretilin  leaders ' social ideas and personal dynamism may have led her to weigh too lightly th e ir  weaknesses—for example, a tendency to factional d isputes and organizational d isa rray , and a casual disdain, common among T hird World populists , for democratic procedure—and the magni­tude of their problem s, especially the  enormous gap between th e ir developmental ambitions and the na tu ra l and human resources available. But she is su rely  righ t in believing th a t Fretilin  th reatened  no vital in te res t of Indonesia, and in faulting the  A ustralian government for not supporting  East Timor's cause.
Writing prim arily for an A ustralian audience, Jolliffe has little to say about the role of the  United S ta tes. Noam Chomsky's 1978 testimony to the  F ourth  Committee of the United Nations' General Assembly (published in Inquiry,  February  1979, 
under th e  title  ''East Timor: The P ress C over-up”) describes a Ford Adm inistra­tion concerned only with the la rg e r issues of geopolitics, Indonesian oil, and Amer­ican business, and an American p re ss  which combined ignorance of the facts with its  usual readiness to be frigh tened  by the  spec ter of a "Marxist takeover."  We 
have since learned , in the  cases of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe and N icaragua, th a t Ameri­can support for populist revolutions is  not a to tal im possibility, bu t Timor is not likely to benefit from th a t knowledge. "Isolation," w rites Jolliffe, "is the tra d i­tional enemy of the East Timorese: it was so du ring  the h a rsh est y ears  of Portu­guese colonial ru le  . . . and today , under Indonesian occupation, the  old enemy has re tu rned " (p . x ) .
